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August 30, 2019

(forthcoming in the Research Handbook on Private Law Theories,
edited by Hanoch Dagan and Benjamin Zipursky)

Abstract: Avoiding the reduction of property to a bundle or rights or to the working out of a
single master principle, the architectural theory of property sees property as an integrated system
or structure anchored in certain unifying principles. Because our world is neither chaotic nor
additiviely simple, property law and institutions must achieve their plural ends in a fashion that
manages the inherent complexity of the interaction of valued resource attributes and human
actions. In managing complexity, some of the law’s structures receive functional explanations
and justifications, which can be different from the explanations and justifications that apply to
the system as a whole. In working as a whole, the system exhibits a number of tightly
interwoven design principles, including the centrality of things, rights to exclude and possession,
hybrids of exclusion and governance, modularity, differential formalism, standardization and the
numerus clausus, and “property rule” protection and equity. The architectural approach allows us
to revsit some basic questions in property theory and to capture the dyanamic realtiy of property
law and institutions.

I. Introduction: Why Architecture
Academic discussions of property generally follow one of two paradigms. One is to treat
property as a bundle of rights, in which the identification of any particular right or feature as
“property” is regarded as a matter of convention having no independent significance. On this
approach, discrete issues should be resolved by undertaking a policy analysis limited to each
issue, with no consideration given to how the resolution of that issue fits together with the way
other issues have been resolved. The other paradigm is to identify some overarching metaprinciple that is thought to be served by the institution of property, such as autonomy, efficiency,
equality, or individual flourishing. Individual issues that arise are then examined by advancing
arguments about which resolution does the most to advance the chosen meta-principle.
In this chapter, we outline a different way of thinking about property: property as
architecture. In contrast to the bundle of rights trope, the architectural approach views the
institution of property as an integrated system or structure anchored in certain unifying
principles. The resulting system is capable of accommodating a great deal of complexity and
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changes in technologies and social values. But it does not fall into the trap of depicting property
as a massive heap of ad hoc rules, which would be impossible for ordinary citizens to follow or
even comprehend in navigating through the world of resources. And in contrast to the metaprinciple mode of analysis, the architectural approach does not seek to reduce the institution of
property to being a means to realizing any particular theory of the good. Rather, property is such
a widespread and enduring institution largely because its serves a plurality of ends or goals for
both individuals and larger social units.
The architectual approach is functional, but it focuses its functional analysis on property
as a system or structure designed to resolve conflicts over the use of resources. It considers the
various legal doctrines characteristic of property not in terms of the results they generate in
particular applications, but how they function as a means of achieving a variety of results.
Couched in law and economics terms, the architectural perspective is sensitive to the costs as
well as benefits of property law, and understands that both costs and benefits emerge from a
world of complex interactions of people with respect to resources.
The architecture of property turns out to be quite rich, subtle, and dynamic. Property law
is a complex system that coevolves with the larger social and economic system in which it is
embedded. Property manages this complexity by avoiding too much interconnection between
resources and too little. A system in which everything is connected to everything is chaotic: any
change can set off unpredictable ripple effects. At the opposite extreme, a system in which there
are few to no connections can be treated as simply additive. If law were even close to additive, it
might be seen as a heap of rules and could be correctly characterized as a bundle of rights – an
arbitrarily grouped bunch of inert sticks. Instead, in our in-between world of organized
complexity, property law manages such complexity and for this reason exhibits a number of
design principles.
This Chapter first sets out in Section II how the architecture of property serves its
purposes in the presence of complexity. In a world of neither chaos nor additive simplicity, the
“how” of property becomes one of its characteristic features. Law is not a heap of rules and any
rule or doctrine may contribute indirectly to an emergent feature of the system overall. Complex
system behavior can originate in simple parts if they are connected intensely and in the right
way. Section III then turns to design features of property that are implicit – and sometimes
explicit – in property’s architecture. These include the centrality of things, rights to exclude and
possession, hybrids of exclusion and governance, modularity, differential formalism,
standardization and the numerus clausus, and “property rule” protection and equity. Section IV
draws out some implications for property law theory, and Section V ends with some overall
lessons.
II. Architecture and System
The architectural approach to property seeks to explain and justify how property law and
institutions work in the face of a immense diversity of assets, human aspirations for those assets,
and the inherent limitations of human beings in processing the vast amount of information
created by this diversity. Characteristic of the approach is to distinguish what property does
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from how it does it, with the emphasis on the latter, however intertwined these aspects may be.
The architectural theory pays attention to the function of structures and doctrines and does not
regard them as epiphenomenal.1 Unlike classic Realism it seeks concepts that tie property
together rather than preferring shallow notions close to particulars. A concern with architecture
precludes us from looking at law as a collection of bottom-line results. In this, the architectural
approach is an example of the New Private Law.2
The architectural approach is functional. It does not regard the structures and doctrines of
the common law as engraved in stone. Instead it asks what problem they solve and how. And
the problem, in its most general form, is one of complexity. The world of persons, resources, and
the activities that involve them is hugely complex. A legal system that dealt with these entities
directly, including all their potential interdependencies, would quickly become intractable.3
Property law and institutions gain some of their characteristic architecture from solving
this complexity problem. A complex system is one in which the elements are interconnected
enough that the properties of the whole are difficult to trace to their individual parts.4 The action
is in the interactions. Many of the purposes of property are only relevantly attributed to the
system as a whole. These include furthering autonomy, providing a platform for cooperation,
avoiding conflict, promoting the creation of wealth, developing one’s personhood, and quite
possibly more. To expect that individual rules will necessarily serve any one of these purposes
directly is an unwarranted assumption and an example of the fallacy of division (water molecules
are not wet even though water is wet). They may or may not serve purposes directly, and as we
will see, it makes more sense to expect this of individual rules when they are more separable
from the system as a whole – something we cannot always assume.
Because much of the action in complexity is in the interactions or connectedness in the
system, it is worth asking what shape this takes. Complexity can be roughly grouped into three
broad types.5 If every element is connected to every other, small changes can have massive and
highly unpredictable ripple effects. This is chaos. At the opposite extreme, if elements are
independent with no connections, the effects of the system are the additive sum of the effects of
1

Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357
(2001).
2

Symposium, The New Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (2012); The Oxford Handbook of the New Private
Law (Andrew S. Gold et al. eds., forthcoming); see also Henry E. Smith, Systems Theory: Emergent Private Law
(forthcoming in Oxford Handbook of New Private Law, Andrew Gold, et al., eds.).
3

See Brian Angelo Lee & Henry E. Smith, The Nature of Coasean Property, 59 INT’L REV. ECON. 145, 151–53
(2012); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77,
S93-94 (2011).
4

MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR (2011); HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE
ARTIFICIAL (2d ed. 1981); see also Smith, supra note 2.
5

Lee Alston & Bernardo Mueller, Towards a More Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights, 100 IOWA L. REV.
2255, 2260–65 (2015); see also Henry E. Smith, Complexity and the Cathedral: Making Law and Economics More
Calabresian, 48 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 43 (2019).
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the parts. Optimizing the system is the same as optimizing each part. Finally, in between is
“organized complexity,” in which there are numerous but not total connections.6 We believe that
property systems lie in this middle range: they are organized complexity, rather than chaos or
additive simplicity. By contrast, additive simplicity is often assumed in the so-called bundle-ofrights picture, where it is assumed that every stick can be evaluated in isolation and sticks can be
added or subtracted at will with the meaningless label “property” stuck on as an afterthought.7
Likewise, to regard property as dealing with chaos is a counsel of despair.
The problem of complexity has two sides – benefit and cost. The benefit is a stand-in for
the many purposes property serves. We do not claim that these purposes can be reduced to a
single metric (such as utility), although we do think that the kind of quasi-utilitarianism of law
and economics can serve as a provisional lingua franca (analogously to the way cost-benefit
analysis serves a role in the regulatory context).
The result of this picture of complexity – organized complexity – is the need for
architecture. Individual pieces of the system may serve property’s purposes indirectly – there is a
“gap” between the contours of a rule or feature of property and the system’s overall goals and
effects.8 For example, a local law that mandates contributions to a public library looks like an
unalloyed good until it turns out to be a method of excluding low-income homeowners.9
Property serves plural purposes in a world of complexity and information cost. That’s
why property has an architecture and why it takes the form it does.
III. Design Principles of the Architecture of Property
In this Part, we survey some design principles that characterize the architecture of
property. It bears emphasis at the outset that listing such principles is not inconsistent with seeing
property as a system with an architecture. As we will advert to frequently, each of these
principles is closely related to other principles. If the institution of property is a whole that
possesses certain key principles – emergent principles – that are more than the sum of its parts,
then it should come as no surprise that the principles themselves are synergistic. They work in
tandem to achieve system effects at the level of the law or of society as a whole.

6

Warren Weaver, Science and Complexity, 36 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 536 (1948).

7

See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: Property 69 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
8

Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009).
9

Compare Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
745, 804 (2009) (arguing that property law should favor funding of public libraries because they promote human
flourishing) with Smith, supra note 8, at 987 (pointing out that library funding can sometimes be used to promote
exclusion).
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These emergent principles also point to a possible misconception about the architectural
theory of property. The system of property does not exist for its own sake but for other purposes,
as noted earlier. While we have in the past referred to our approach as emphasizing “information
costs,” we have never taken the position that minimizing information costs is the purpose of
property. Information costs could be minimized by having only one property interest and
prohibiting alienation, but such a system would have obvious and severe drawbacks.10 Instead,
informational requirements need to be optimized in an overall design that pairs benefits and
costs. One way to think about the evolution of property is to draw on evolutionary models, in
which information cost is built into the process, whether directed or undirected, of moving
property institutions to higher “fitness” where fitness is a stand-in for the aforementioned
purposes of property law as whole.11
A key insight of the architectural theory is its focus on the whole. When it comes to
individual doctrines and rules, the question may or may not be well posed if asked in the usual
form: is this doctrine or rule efficient, fair, moral etc.? Only if the rule in question is relatively
separable from the system does it even make sense to ask that kind of question. And ultimately,
the value of rules or doctrines is their contribution to the fitness – the serving of purposes – of
the entire institution of property. And that contribution need not be additive in a linear sense or
even approximately linear. There are, as we will see, important features of property law and
property institutions that do not contribute to the system of property in additive fashion.
Conventional stick-by-stick analysis is especially wrongheaded for such rules and doctrines.
The architectural theory crucially distinguishes between the system and moves made
within the system. Out in terms of John Rawls’s distinction, our approach adopts the practice
view rather than the summary view of rules: property law defines the practice rather than simply
summarizing behavior.12 The architectural view of property makes room for justification at the
system level to differ from the justification that are invoked in applying a rule or doctrine. In
this, our approach can be called broadly Humean.13 Thus “[p]roperty rights serve human

10

Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 503 (3d ed. 2017).

11

For similar reasons, we disagree that the architectural approach’s cognizance of information costs, commits it to
looking at property law like a machine that needs minimal tinkering – or that it requires one to downplay human
flourishing. Cf. Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (2010).
12

John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). In private law theory, Felipe Jiménez has argued for
the application of this distinction to contract law, that contract as a whole serves economic efficiency, but rules
within contact law are couched in moral terms. Felipe Jiménez, The Pluralism of Contract: A Theory of Contract
Law (JSD dissertation, N.Y.U. School of Law, 2019); see also Benjamin J. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6
LEGAL THEORY 457, 458 (2000).
13

DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. III, pt. II, secs. 2-5 (L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed., 2d ed., Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978) (1739-40) (making the distinction between institutions and norms within the institution in
the course of analyzing property).
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values,”14 but it need not be the case that every invocation of the law of trespass, or even the rule
itself, can be fully justified, much less to a court, in such a fashion.
A. Things
The most basic architectural – and, in that sense, foundational – principle is that property
is about things.15 Things are discrete objects that are perceived as being separate from other
things and from persons.16 The simplest and most universal type of property consists of objects
that are naturally perceived as separate things – objects like tools, foodstuffs, articles of clothing,
or domestic animals. Here ordinary visual perception does the work of identifying things. As
societies became more complex, property extends to objects that are artificially delineated as
things separate from other things, such as tracts of land marked off by cairns or fences or walls.
Here community norms and customs enter into the understanding of what constitutes a thing,
although it is striking that land marked off by fences or walls is universally recognized as a thing
separate from surrounding land (whether similarly marked off or not).17 In the most advanced
societies, the identification of things extends even further, to the point that purely intangible
interests such as shares of stock or intellectual goods like patents and copyrights are assimilated
to the realm of things.
The set of things eligible for treatment as property is constrained by certain natural
limitations, in the sense of limitations not created by customary norms or law. If an object is so
plentiful that there is no human interest in establishing rights to use or exploit it, it will not be
regarded as eligible for treatment as property. Oxygen in the air has long been so regarded. If an
object is viewed in predominantly negative ways, such that there is no interest in harvesting or
utilizing it, like mosquitos or gnats, it will not be regarded as eligible for treatment as property.
If an object is very difficult to define or delineate, such as abstract ideas, it will not be regarded
as eligible for treatment as property. One could say in each case these objects are not “legal
things,” in the sense of things that constitute the foundation of a system of property.
The law plays a variable role in determining what constitutes a thing eligible for
treatment as property. With respect to movables and land, the law functions largely to backstop
the delineations of things created by natural perception or customary norms. The creation of
survey systems for identifying different plots of land, for example, greatly strengthens the
identification of different tracts of land as things, relative to customary regimes based on
14

State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971).

15

Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1701–08 (2012).

16

J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 111 (1997); FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE
FOR STUDENTS OF THE COMMON LAW 127 (3d ed. 1911), Frederick Pollock, What Is a Thing?, 10 L.Q. REV. 318, 318,
320-21 (1894); see also Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 381 (2005).
17

See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Inevitable Trend Toward Universally Recognizable Signals of Property
Claims: An Essay for Carol Rose, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1015, 1022–32 (2011); Carol M. Rose, Possession
as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985).
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physical markings.18 When we get to the intangible rights important to modern economies, the
law often plays a larger role, to the point that the law is entirely responsible for delineating some
set of interests as things. The adoption of individual tradeable quotas (ITQs) for harvesting fish,
for example, is entirely dependent on the enactment of a legal regime that defines the rights,
allocates them among potentially interested parties, and provides a mechanism for their
enforcement and exchange.19 Whether we are speaking of movables, land, or intangible rights,
the law also plays a role in declaring certain things off limits for treatment as property, such as
making it illegal to hold another person as a slave or to create exclusive rights in the distribution
of the texts of laws or other government documents. Here property is disallowed not because
treatment as things is not possible but because it is immoral or against public policy.
The fundamental principle that property concerns things is obviously important in
differentiating property from other sorts of interests, such as the interest individuals have in
protecting their own person from harm by others (protected by the law of tort and criminal law),
the interest persons have in the enforcing promises made to them by others (protected primarily
by the law of contract), and the interest individuals have in recognizing certain status
relationships such as those between spouses and between parents and children (protected
primarily by family law). It is often said that property is concerned with the rights and
obligations of persons, but the critical qualification is that property concerns the rights and
obligations of persons with respect to things. The presence of a thing is what distinguishes
property from other types of interests of importance to persons. (And, as we will see, the rights
are often communicated through the thing.)
Thinghood involves separation of various kinds. Much of the problem property solves is
founded on the contingent connection between things and those with rights in them.20 As we will
see, possession is probably the earliest and remains in many ways the most important such
connection. (See Section III.B.) But the fragility of the connection between persons and things
forms the basis for the law’s intervention again theft and fraud – and its elaborate but not too
elaborate system of tracking and maintaining the connections between persons and their things.
And because whether a thing counts as a thing is a matter of separation, and a thing can be more
or less separated from its surrounding context thinghood is in a sense a matter of degree.21

18

See, e.g., Maureen E. Brady, The Forgotten History of Metes and Bounds, 128 YALE L.J. 872 (2019); Gary D.
Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions, 119 J. POL.
ECON. 426 (2011).
19

Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275.

20

DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 487-488, 502-504 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1978); PENNER,
supra note 16, at 111.
21

Henry E. Smith, The Economics of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOLUME
2: PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 148 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017). On partial decomposability, see Simon,
HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL (2d ed. 1981); see also Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture
of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 467, 477 (1962).
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The centrality of things is also responsible for a core feature of the rights and obligations
associated with property, namely that they apply to “all the world” without regard to whether
anyone has personally agreed to be bound. Tellingly, this feature is often identified as the “in
rem” nature of property. “In rem” literally means with respect to a thing. Rights and obligations
are of course rights and obligations of persons.22 But when they concern property, the existence
of these rights and obligations is transmitted in and through the thing. The identification of a
thing as property communicates to perfect strangers that they have a duty not to take, intrude
upon, or otherwise interfere with the thing. It is unnecessary to know who owns the thing or
what the status of their ownership might be.23 The same feature applies to the interests of
persons in protecting their bodily integrity and reputation. But these interests are communicated
through the status of persons as human beings. The rights and duties associated with property
are communicated through things recognized as being subjects of the system of property.
The anchoring of property in discrete things also helps reduce the information costs
associated with property systems more generally. Any system for organizing rights to assets that
imposes duties on “all the world” presents a potentially enormous informational problem.24 If
everyone had to carry around a list of things they own, and communicate such a list to everyone
they encounter, the informational burden would quickly become insurmountable. By reducing
the inquiry to identifying things that are conventionally part of the system of property, these
costs are dramatically reduced. Persons need only identify discrete things which are
conventionally owned in order to avoid interfering with the rights of others, or to initiate further
inquiries about ownership in order to engage in some kind of exchange of rights.
B. Right to Exclude and Possession
Closely related to thingness is a general principle of property – that it allocates to
particular persons (including institutions) the right to exclude all the world from a thing.25 This
right is often implemented through notions of possession, or their analogues for intangibles.
The centrality of the exclusion right has been recognized by a wide variety of scholars
and courts over time.26 The functional significance of the right is that it allocates control over
22

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710,
720-21 (1917).
23

PENNER, supra note 16, at 75-76.

24

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 789809 (2001).
25
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061 (2012).
26

See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE (1996); BEN MCFARLANE, THE STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY LAW
132-204 (2008); PENNER, supra note 16; Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.,
740-52 (1998); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude II, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J.
1 (2014); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and
Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 602-05 (2008); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in
Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275 (2008); Smith, supra note 15, at 1704-05; James Y. Stern, The Essential
Structure of Property Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1167 (2017).
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the thing to designated persons. In order to use, enter, exploit, or develop the thing, all the world
must obtain the permission of the person with the right to exclude. The person with the right to
exclude can either deny, grant, or condition access to the thing in such a way as to determine
how it will be used.
There has been considerable confusion about what it means to say that the right to
exclude is fundamental to property. The right to exclude is not some kind of goal or value in and
of itself – any more than the identification of some object as a thing is a goal or value in and of
itself.27 The exclusion right is a means to end, which is the allocation of the right to control
assets to particular persons.28 This dispersion of control is what makes property such a valuable
social institution, whether by advancing individual autonomy, providing a basis for developing
individual future plans, promoting the efficient use of resources, creating incentives for
productive investment, or other valued ends. And, again, the right to exclude can serve these
ends indirectly, as part of the overall complexity of property.29
Nor does the importance of the right to exclude mean that the right to exclude is absolute
or unqualified. The law has long recognized exceptional circumstances in which the right to
exclude gives way to some kind of privilege of entry, whether it be the defense of necessity to
trespass or the implied license given to firefighters to enter a burning building. Modern antidiscrimination and public accommodation laws provide other examples. The critical point is that
property requires that some designated person be given enough exclusion right that it can be said
that this person exercises significant discretionary control over the use of the thing.
How did property come to feature the right to exclude as a critical element of its
architecture? There is both a functional and a historical explanation, which are mutually
reinforcing. Both are grounded more or less in possession.
The functional explanation reverts again to the informational burden associated with any
system of rights and duties that applies to all the world. The right to exclude communicates a
very simple message to the world: keep off, don’t take. Even persons with little or no formal
education or young children can comprehend the message. If property were identified by a
feature that lies closer to the goals or ends that a system of property is thought to achieve – such
as the promotion of individual autonomy, the realization of life plans, the enhancement of
efficient use of resources, or the encouragement of productive investment – only the most
sophisticated members of society would be able to offer an opinion as to who is in charge of
27

See, e.g., Smith, supra note 15, at 1705 (“Exclusion is at the core of this architecture because it is a default, a
convenient starting point. Exclusion is not the most important or “core” value because it is not a value at all.
Thinking that exclusion is a value usually reflects the confusion of means and ends in property law: exclusion is a
rough first cut--and only that-- at serving the purposes of property.”).
28

In this respect, our framework diverges from Kantian approaches, which take exclusion to be an aspect of the
relevant interpersonal relationship. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Possession and Use, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 156 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., 2013).
29

Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Prism, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 247, 254 (2011).
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what. And even then, they would likely disagree. The right to exclude translates into control
over resources, and does so with a simple, easily communicated message.
A possible rejoinder is that courts, insofar as they adjudicate property disputes, are
capable of processing a more complicated message than “keep off” and “don’t take.” No doubt
this is true. But courts consider only a tiny fraction of the number of disputes about property that
occur in the real world. Property norms operate millions of times a day in all corners of society
without the intervention of learned scholars, lawyers, or judges. And the point about the
potential for disagreement over the proper application of the goals or ends of a system of
property is fully applicable to any proposal to have courts adjudicate property disputes by
referring to these goals or ends. So courts are well advised to resolve cases involving trespass,
conversion, and larceny without engaging in ruminations about who is most deserving or will
make the best use of the thing. These torts – and the norms they reinforce – key off possession
or its close analogues. And with rare exceptions, this is in fact how they proceed.
The historical explanation is that property norms started out as intuitions about
possession and the right of persons who are in possession to maintain that possession against
interference by others. Possessory norms could emerge from bilateral interactions between those
desiring to use resources.30 Establishing possession entails establishing and communicating
exclusive control over a thing. And a right to possession is a right to exclude others from
interfering with such exclusive control over a thing. Thus, insofar as norms about possession
come before legal property systems are developed – and insofar as norms about possession
continue to undergird legal property systems – the right to exclude will naturally transfer to legal
norms about property.31
Possessory notions display a layered structure consistent with this history and the
function such notions serve. As concrete notions of possession became less adequate to situations
of greater specialization and more complex activity, they were supplemented with notions of
constructive possession and rights to possess, all of which work in tandem to produce complex
legal effects.32
C. Hybrids of Exclusion and Governance
While exclusion is the starting point in delineating rights to things and is tightly
interwoven with thinghood itself, the strategies for delineating property rights fall along a

30

Samuel Bowles & Jung-Kyoo Choi, Coevolution of Farming and Private Property, 110 PNAS 8830 (2013);
David Friedman, A Positive Account of Property Rights, 11(2) SOCIAL PHIL. & POL’Y 1 (1994). On the shape of
possessory conventions in such frameworks, see HUME, supra note 20, at 484-501; ROBERT SUGDEN, THE
ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE (2004).
31

Thomas W. Merrill, Ownership and Possession, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 9 (Yun-Chien Chang
ed., 2015).
32

Henry E. Smith, The Elements of Possession, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 65 (Yun-Chien Chang ed.,
2015).
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spectrum from exclusion to governance.33 Exclusion and governance are poles of a spectrum of
strategies for delineating rights. A possessor’s or owner’s interest in using a clusters of attributes
can be protected by giving that person control over access or control over use. Implementing this
control involves selecting proxies for harm to the interest in use that can form the basis for
violations of the right. In exclusion, the proxy is not formulated directly in terms of use and
typically involves not crossing a boundary (trespass) or performing some clear action (taking).34
As we move toward governance, the proxies for violation are more directly tied to use, as with
easements, covenants, the law of nuisance, and land use regulation.35
Because it refers fairly relatively directly to use, governance can be used as between
neighbors (at the interface of packages of rights), and it can be used internally to govern the
behavior of multiple persons with access to the same resource. This is especially important in
common property (as opposed to open access property and classic private property).36
Different resources will call for varying treatment in terms of exclusion and governance.
Because some resources are difficult to bound, or to treat as separate things, they may be less
amenable to exclusion and more suited to governance. “Fluid” resources have this feature, and
we find heavy reliance on governance in areas like water law and intellectual property.37 Also,
where specialized functions are important, simple access control will typically not be enough.
This is why entity property like condominiums and corporations place most of their emphasis on
governance once separate functions (e.g., management vs. enjoyment) have been separated. 38 It
is a misconception that the architectural theory of property has no place for governance:
governance has been at its heart all along.39
33
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D. Modularity
Related to hybrids of exclusion and governance is the role of modularity in property. The
exclusion-governance set-up allows much interaction between sticks and between resourcerelated activities to occur “internally” to a property interest, with especially important and
difficult interdependencies between such interests and other interests and context being handled
at the “interface” through governance strategies.40
Modularity runs even deeper in property law. Different things subject to the system of
property can be combined or separated to form new things which are also regarded as property,
without any need to inquire as to the status of the component elements that make up the whole.
In keeping with the architectural theme, one can picture property as Legoland, in which blocks
can be snapped together or taken apart in ways that suit the needs of those who have the
appropriate rights to the individual blocks.
This feature of property obviously contributes in a major way to its functional value.
Stones can be fixed to handles that make them into tools or weapons. Structures can be added to
land which makes it habitable. Crops that grow on the land can be severed and sold separately as
foodstuffs. Short stories that have been copyrighted by different authors can be assembled as
anthologies, and so forth.
Like other general principles of property, the modular feature operates without
controversy or explicit acknowledgment in most everyday applications. If A acquires as her own
property pieces of wood, nails, and paint, and assembles these items into a painted chair, no one
questions that the chair is now a thing that also belongs to A. Similarly, if B acquires some land,
wooden forms, a shovel, and bags of cement, and assembles uses these items to build a
foundation for a house on the land, no one questions that the foundation belongs to B as part of
the thing which is the land.
Property achieves this feature of modularity through various accessionary doctrines.41
Typically, these come into play only when there is some reason to question the connectedness of
two or more things held as property. Some accessionary doctrines have nearly universal
application, such as the understanding that newborn animals belong to the owner of the mother,
or that trees that grow from the soil belong to the owner of the land.42 Others have a more
complex or contestable quality, such as the law of fixtures that determines whether an article of
moveable property is sufficiently connected to the land that it should be regarded as being part of
the land, or the ad coelum principle, which says that valuable minerals discovered underground
belong to the owner of the surface.43 In general, accessionary doctrines are designed to tell us

40
41

Smith, supra note 15.
Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459 (2009).
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what-goes-with-what in cases where there is some question or doubt about the answer.44 But the
existence of a relatively small number of contestable cases should not obscure the operation of
the modularity principle, which silently applies in the vast majority of cases in which distinct
things are assembled or taken apart without any question being raised about the continuity of
respective property rights in things.
E. Differential Formalism
The modular structure and exclusion strategy make property more “formal” than it might
otherwise be. As in other areas of private law, there is a lot of discussion and controversy around
the issue of formalism. The Legal Realists, whose legacy we still live with, defined themselves in
opposition to a supposedly earlier formalism.45 In property as in contract law, formalists and
contextualists often square off against each other, with the former emphasizing certainty and low
transaction costs and the latter preferring more tailored and judicially expert decisions that
employ parts of the context that relate to fairness.
The architectural theory of property points toward a more nuanced approach to
formalism. Formalism can quite generally be regarded as relative invariance to context.46 Thus
computer languages and the language of first-order logic are more formal than natural languages
like English and Japanese, because the latter require more context. Informal everyday
mathematical notation likewise requires more shared context than that used for published proofs.
Within a language like English, everyday speech requires a lot of context whereas in more
impersonal contexts speech relies on less context – it is more formal.
In law generally, there is a tradeoff between communicating with a (typically) smaller,
socially closer audience in a compressed way and a wider more impersonal audience is a more
elaborate way.47 The more elaborate version is more formal, because context cannot be assumed
implicitly in these socially more distant contexts.
In the law of property, audience matters – and varies a lot by situation.48 The classic in
rem right is broadcast to all the world (or everyone in society). This generally calls for spelled
out formalism rather than implicit contextually-contingent meaning. In some scenarios, such as
easements and covenants, and the law of neighbors (e.g., nuisance) more context can be assumed
and the law need not be so formal. Custom is an excellent testing ground: custom within a
community can be very shorthand by depending on the shared knowledge of the community

44
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members.49 When custom is applied to non-members or is adapted into general law it generally
has to be formalized more.
Finally, the contrast between contract and property is partly one of formalism. While
formalism varies within both contracts and property, we expect generally property to more
formal than contract. For one thing, property rights typically last longer and so have to reach an
audience that is teemporally more distant.50 And as said before, property rights avail against
third parties who can presumed to have even less shared background information than the typical
contracting party. Boilerplate is in a sense a step on the road to the type of situation that is more
common in property.51 Differential formalism is tightly connected to the architecture of
property.
F. Standardization and the Numerus Clausus
Closely related to formalism is standardization, and our next general principle of property
systems is the numerus clausus, meaning “closed number” of property forms. What this means is
that property is held in one of a finite number of recognized forms. The principle appears most
clearly in mature legal property systems, where we find the law limiting property to a number of
reasonably well-defined legal forms, such as the fee simple, the life estate, the lease, the trust,
and so forth. Presumably a similar principle applies in pre-modern societies, although
documentation of this is sparse or nonexistent. For example, it is plausible in many such
societies that property or possessory rights may be held only as collective property, the chief’s
property, or individual property, or some similar division.
The numerus clausus manifests itself in different ways in different legal systems. In
Roman law and modern civil law generally, the numerus clausus is generally an important
constraint, although it differs in explicitness. In civil law systems that derive from the German
Civil Code, the numerus clausus is an explicit restriction on the number and type of forms in
which property can be held.52 In common law systems, the numerus clausus operates as a
principle of interpretation, in which grants of property in deeds or wills will be interpreted as
falling into one of the limited number of recognized legal forms.53 Thus, even if the grantor
49
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50
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51
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unambiguously tries to impose an idiosyncratic restriction on property, courts will disregard the
intent and will squeeze the conveyance into one of the recognized forms. The court will then say
it was the intent of the grantor to create the particular form to which the grant most closely
conforms. Whether it exists as an explicit legal restriction or as a principle of interpretation, the
numerus clausus appears to be a universal principle followed by all property systems. Even
systems that purport to have an “open” catalog of property forms (numerus apertus) manage one
way or another to set limits on the creation of new forms.54 It is part of the architecture of
property.
In mature legal systems that recognize a robust freedom of contract, the numerus clausus
presents something of a puzzle. Any two individuals, A and B, can agree by contract to a
limitless number of restriction on the use of their respective things. But in order to have such
restriction “run” with the thing, such that it will be binding any successor in interest to A or B or
otherwise bind third parties, the restrictions will have to conform to a recognized form. What is
the reason for this restriction on freedom of contract, whereby parties must limit their aspirations
to restrict the future use of their property to those permitted by one of a finite number of
recognized forms?
Our explanation for the numerus clausus returns once more to information costs.55 If
property could be held in a limitless number of forms, then anyone interested in participating in a
transaction of property rights would have to engage in a costly and time-consuming investigation
to see if the thing in question is held in some idiosyncratic fashion. By “transaction,” we include
not only purchases of property but also other types of conveyances such as leases and the
creation of security interests in property in order to borrow money. In a world of limitless
property forms, any potential purchaser, lessee, or secured lender would have to engage in a
burdensome search before entering into the transaction to make sure the property was not
encumbered by some restriction that could defeat their objectives. In contrast, if all property
must be held in one of a finite number of legal forms, the parties can be confident that the thing
can be restricted only in the ways permitted by the form to which it most closely corresponds.
The numerus clausus, in other words, exists in order to limit an informational externality – the
additional search costs that potential transactors would incur if property could be held in limitless
and idiosyncratic forms.
The numerus clausus is of some relevance for other third parties as well. The reason that
third parties are impacted by information costs is that they don’t want to be saddled with
unwanted duties and liabilities. Thus, with respect to non-successor third parties, the problem of
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information costs is intertwined with the non-consensual nature of rights good against the world.
Also, the forms that are allowed will (or should be) be the most valuable.56
It is worth emphasizing that the architectural approach does not reduce property to a
system for minimizing information costs. Information costs could be minimized by having one
form or never allowing transfer. Instead information and other costs need to be (roughly)
optimized in light of the purposes that property serves. Our model is a cost-benefit model.
As with exclusion and governance, standardization is not only not absolute – it does not
operate in a vacuum. Standardization works in tandem with other notice giving devices like
possession and title records. Title records do not completely solve the notice problem and
remove the need for standardization. Information costs go beyond the problem of verifying rights
and even – or especially – registries require information to be in a standardized format.57
Strong evidence for the importance of standardization and its relation to “in rem”-ness
comes from the patterns within areas of property law. Those aspects of property that are the most
in rem are the most standardized, while the most in personam, are the least, with aspects that
involve many definite parties or few indefinite parties – situations of intermediate information
cost – somewhere in between in their degree of standardization.58 This pattern shows up in such
disparate areas as trusts, bailments, security interests, and landlord-tenant.
The trust allows for a lot of variation without major third party information costs. An
interest in trust is a close functional substitute for an in rem right, but to the rest of the world it is
not of legal relevance other than to third party purchasers with notice or who do not give value.59
Closely related to standardization is interoperability. Modular packages of property
rights like those over parcels of land combine well and scale up or down because their properties
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are standardized.60 The rights and duties in nuisance and lateral support work seamlessly for
combined or divided parcels. This aspect of standardization helps implement modularity.
G. “Property Rule” Protection and Equity
A final general design principle is a preference for specific relief in cases involving
disputes over property. To use the vocabulary introduced by Calabresi and Melamed, property is
generally protected by “property rules” rather than “liability rules.”61 In large measure, this
follows as a natural corollary of some of the other principles already mentioned. In order to
protect the owner’s right to exclude others from her thing, as assembled or severed from other
things, the law requires others to desist from interfering with her thing. Unlike the law of
contract and the law of personal injury torts, the law of property resists the notion that one can
“take and pay for” the property of another.
In contrast to some of the other principles, such as the centrality of things or the right to
exclude, the preference for specific relief has had to struggle to emerge over time. In large
measure, this was because of institutional limitations of the courts. Courts could readily issue
judgments for damages, and enforce these with writs of execution or garnishment. But ordering
a defendant to desist from interference raises more difficult questions of monitoring for
compliance and potential actions to enforce compliance through contempt proceedings. To be
sure, the early writs of novel disseisin and nuisance contemplated specific relief, in the form of
restoration to possession or abatement of the nuisance. But the more general preference for
specific relief began to fill out only with the emergence of the court of chancery, and its
development of a more complete set of remedies including the injunction and the constructive
trust. Tellingly, the jurisdiction of the court of chancery was long limited to enforcing rights of
property.62 Only in the modern era have equitable remedies expanded to include other kinds of
interests.
The preference for specific relief, at least in cases involving knowing interference with
property rights, has a simple functional explanation, to wit, protection of the reliance interests of
persons with respect to property.63 The value of property has always been linked with notions of
stability of expectation. People acquire property to pursue a variety of ends. The protection of
property against deliberate interference is integral to allowing individuals to pursue these ends.
Some ends may be quite idiosyncratic or fanciful. But more commonly, they are integrally
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important to the realization of individual autonomy, or family security, or a desire to undertake
value-enhancing improvements.
Of course “property rule” and “liability rule” are not legal categories. Instead, one of the
main methods of implementing property rule protection is the injunction, a creature of equity.64 It
turns out that traditional equity also embodies design principles that are an important aspect of
the architecture of property. Equity has a structure – it is a second-order overlay on the regular
law.65 As such it is far more targeted but much more contextual than the regular law. Multipolar
problems, conflicting rights, and opportunism are especially amenable to second-order solutions,
and these are among the special concerns of equity from a functional standpoint. Having law
and equity specialize allows equity to be more intense and law to be more formal, which in
certain aspects has a particular importance for law.
Equity’s second-order contribution is targeted but pervasive. When it comes to building
encroachments, injunctions are presumptive but the presumption can be overcome if the
encroachment was innocent and there is disproportionate hardship (not equipoise).
Disproportionate hardship is key to injunctions in nuisance – something missed by the court in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement in its “liability rule” opinion66 – and equity is especially suited to
reconciling conflicting presumptive rights between neighbors.67 Equity also prevents the use of
injunctions where someone is manufacturing a lawsuit.68
IV. Further Implications
The architectural theory of property invites us to revisit some basic questions about what
property theory is for in the first place.
At the most practical level, the architectural theory makes room for a new empiricism in
property. The additive rule-by-rule or “heap” conception of property, including extreme versions
of the bundle of rights, implicitly make some very strong “all else equal” assumptions. Analysis
can focus on one piece of the system and assume that everything else stays the same. The
architectural view makes us ask when and how much such assumptions can and should be made.
Thus, some parts of property law are more detachable, such as the contractual aspects of
64
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landlord-tenant; the implied warranty of habitability can be studied on its own (up to a point).
By contrast, the notion of possession is so intertwined with the rest of property law that it would
be difficult to change it without ripple effects. A higher-level prediction is that those aspects of
property law that are more integrated into the system should be, all else equal, more difficult to
change, whereas the more separable ones should be more amenable to alteration.69 By and large
we do find this pattern. Structural aspects of property law often converge between systems for
functional reasons, such as the definition of things and the basics of conversion. However, more
“stylistic” aspects diverge if they are more interconnected with other aspects of the legal system
and converge if they are more isolated.70 As in other human activities and artifacts, style is a
characteristic way of doing things that could be otherwise. In property law, the common law
relies more heavily on possession whereas civil law defines rights in terms of dominion. Or a
lease can be a contract given some in rem features or can be defined as an in rem interest with
special limits. Both structure and style relate to the architecture of property but in different
ways. The architectural theory brings these questions to the fore.
In many ways, the architectural theory of property is a fulfillment of the promises of
Legal Realism. It extends Realism’s functionalism and openness to interdisciplinary tools to the
more systematic aspects of property, including its doctrines. With Llewellyn, the architectural
perspective can view rules as means to ends and to ask them to prove their worth71 – but then
gives them a chance to do so. The architectural view avoids confusing complication with true
complexity and thus it avoids the “rigidification of rule and imagination” that supposedly follows
from conceptualism.72 It suggests ways in which rules and doctrines should be changed in light
of changes in complex conditions. Airplane overflights and the appropriability of intangibles
will not leave trespass and conversion or perhaps even possession the same as before. Indeed, the
dynamism of property law can be located not just in its evolving concepts but in their
relationships.
Most importantly, the architectural view is a better fit with reality, in our complex but not
chaotic world. A standard trope of Realism was that the modern world was too complex for the
fusty old private law or the confines of conceptualism,73 and it formed one of the rationales for
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the American Law Institute’s Restatement projects.74 Whatever the state of Realism today this
inclination has survived well.75 However, complexity is not an argument for complexity in the
concepts themselves. The system has to manage complexity, which may (or may not) require
simplicity at some point at the micro level of the system. Again, in complex systems local
simplicity, such as simple intuitive rules (like keep out, don’t take) can interact with other rules
and context to create a highly complex set of system properties.76
The architectural theory also poses more precise questions about the judicial role. Some
principles like the numerus clausus are directly if implicitly about judicial self-restraint. More
subtly, the point that some parts of the system are more integrated than others in the system of
property law means that judicial intervention is easier in the latter than in the former. Some
changes to the system are so fundamental that statutes may be required.77 The architectural view
points to the hybrid of property as both a made and spontaneous order78 and tries to match one
kind of evolution or the other to the landscape in question.
The architectural view is not a counsel of conservatism but of realism in the true sense.
For example, property theorists were generally of the view that a statutory “right to roam” over
unenclosed land was unambiguous progress. The possibility of cost did not figure in that
literature, yet a subsequent empirical study found large and significant costs to creating a
statutory right to roam.79 While we need to wait to see whether such a result holds up in further
studies, it is important to ask about both benefits and costs. Some costs stem from the
interconnectedness of the “sticks” in the bundle: the roaming stick and the exclusion stick
interact. While we see a major role for custom in property law and codifying this custom might
be worth it, it is an empirical question whether any particular custom like the right to roam
should be elevated to a statutory right. That it is an empirical question and one worth raising are
highlighted on the architectural theory.
Finally, we come to a term about we which harbor some ambivalence. Our work has
sometimes been grouped into a school of thought called the “New Essentialism,”80 and we admit
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we have done our share to give this term some currency. By this term may be meant that a
theory sees some feature, say thinghood or the right to exclude as essential to property, in the
sense that it can form the basis of a definition. Or, more realistically, that these features
distinguish property from other areas. Or that it is something about property that cannot be
replicated by contract.81 Thus, rights to things good against the world cannot in a world of
positive transaction costs be created through contract alone. All of these formulations get at
something, but miss something – something essential – about the architecture of property. Like
the architecture of buildings and cities, one cannot understand property except in terms of
function and how that function is served. The complexity of the world in the relevant settings –
persons interacting with respect to scarce resources – profoundly shapes property law and
institutions. That complexity points towards some rationale for doctrines and features of
property that are sometimes dismissed as mere formalism or arbitrary relics: they serve to
manage complexity in a world of scarce resources – including the resources that can be devoted
to defining rights and processing information about them. The architectural view has a built-in
dynamism. The architectural view allows us to avoid making every question like every other – a
microcosm of economic and political theory divorced from background conditions and reality
itself. If that makes one an essentialist, then that’s what we are.
V. Conclusion
The architectural theory of property brings property law back to the forefront. While not
in any way denying the purposes property serves, it highlights how property achieves its
objectives (or doesn’t) in a world of complex interaction. It is the complexity of the world and
the interactions the law has to manage that gives property law and institutions many of their
characteristic contours – including their design principles and their inherent dynamism.
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